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I. INTRODUCTION
The question put to Moses when he intervened in a dispute
raises a fundamental question of jurisprudence: By what authority
do judges have the power to make rules and decide cases? In the
twentieth century, the answer almost always is that a constitutional
or statutory provision gives them that power. Thus, it is often easy
to forget that courts also possess powers that predate and are
largely independent of state and federal constitutions and statutes.
One of these powers is the supervisory power.2 By supervisory
power, this Article refers to the power exercised by courts, which
sometimes is based on a constitutional or statutory provision grant-
ing such power, to establish rules and reverse cases in the interests
of justice, judicial integrity, and notions of good policy.3 The su-
2. Other powers include implied powers and inherent powers. These two
concepts sometimes are confused, but there is a distinction. See FELIx F. STUMFF,
INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS: SWORD AND SHIELD OF THE JUDICIARY 5 (1994).
Inherent powers are "powers that are reasonably necessary for the conduct of a
court's constitutional functions and that grow out of the court's jurisdiction." Id.
Implied powers are powers that "arise out of and are necessary to carry out the
authority expressly granted and contemplated either constitutionally or legisla-
tively." Id.; see also infra Part IV.C (discussing the relationship between inherent
powers and the supervisory power).
3. There is considerable disagreement over the scope of the term "supervi-
sory power." One commentator argues:
Supervisory power as such does not exist. The supervisory power label
has been used to describe the exercise of several different forms ofjudi-
cial power. Use of the term supervisory power has diverted attention
from the nature, source, and limits of the authority being exercised in
each case .... [I]t seems plain that the term supervisory power should
be abandoned.
Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and
Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1433, 1520
(1984). Another commentator defines supervisory power as "any decision not
based on the Constitution, statutes, procedural rules, or precedent, including de-
cisions based on policy grounds." Murray M. Schwartz, The Exercise of Supervisory
Power by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, 27 VILL. L. REv. 506, 508 (1982). In the
state court context, this definition is problematic because many states have consti-
tutional or statutory provisions which give supervisory power. See infra notes 62,
67. It also is problematic because in those cases in which the court does not rely
on a constitutional or statutory provision, the court often will rely on one of its
own precedents discussing, however tersely, its supervisory power.
[Vol. 23
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pervisory power has been used with increasing frequency in both
federal4 and state courts5 in the past few decades. Although the su-
pervisory power of the federal courts has been a regular topic for
commentators,6 very little has been written about the supervisory
power of state courts.7 The federal court supervisory power deci-
sions are not binding on the state courts, and the federal courts'
supervisory power may be meeting its demise." This fact, coupled
with the frequent exercise of supervisory power in recent years by
the Minnesota Supreme Court, highlights the importance of the
state court supervisory power.9 Because the supervisory power is
One federal court has defined supervisory powers as "common law powers to
establish procedures for the courts' internal operations when statutes and rules
are silent." United States v. Rodriguez, 888 F.2d 519, 527 (7th Cir. 1989). The
same circuit has indicated that the supervisory power has two separate meanings:
(1) "the authority to announce new rules that promote the administration ofjus-
tice, even though neither constitution nor statute require such rules" and (2) the
"power to reverse judgments without requiring a demonstration that the error in
question affected the outcome." United States v. Widgery, 778 F.2d 325, 328-29
(7th Cir. 1985).
4. See infra Part II.C (discussing federal cases in which the court invoked its
supervisory power).
5. See, e.g., Pierce v. State, 677 N.E.2d 39 (Ind. 1997); Shackelford v. Chester
County Hosp., 690 A.2d 732 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); Cruz v. Virginia, 482 S.E.2d
880 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
6. See generally Beale, supra note 3; Alfred Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Su-
pervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 181 (1969); Office of Legal Policy, The Judiciary's
Use of Supervisory Power to Control Federal Law Enforcement Activity, 22 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 783 (1989); Schwartz, supra note 3; Matthew E. Brady, Note, A Separation
of Powers Approach to the Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 34 STAN. L. REV. 427
(1982); L. Douglas Harris, Note, Supervisory Power in the United States Courts of Ap-
peals, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 642 (1978); Note, The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the
Federal Courts, 53 GEO. L.J. 1050 (1965) [hereinafter Georgetown Note]; Note, The
Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1656 (1963).
7. One commentator noted, "I have been unable to find in the journals any
discussion of the exercise by state courts of a supervisory power similar to that ex-
ercised by federal courts." Bennett L. Gershman, Supervisory Power of the New York
Courts, 14 PACE L. REv. 41, 42 n.4 (1994).
8. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
9. This more frequent use may be part of a broader trend of state courts
filling the void in the area of criminal law left by a more conservative federal judi-
ciary. Cf STUMPF, supra note 2, at xviii.
The growth of inherent powers law is part of the more general growth
and development of state constitutional law. Political scientists Alan Tarr
and Mary Cornelia Porter have argued that some of the most creative ef-
forts in constitutional law are taking place in state courts, after decades
of scholarly attention to federal developments. In the field of inherent
powers, state courts have been far more active than federal courts.
Id.; see also Peter W. Gorman, Note, Rights of Criminal Defendants: The Emerging In-
dependence of State Courts, 2 HAMLINE L. REv. 83, 85 (1979) (noting that state su-
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largely independent of constitutional and statutory provisions, it is
important to scrutinize closely its source, nature, and scope, lest it
become merely a too-willing servant ofjudicial whim.
Part II of this Article examines the historical background of
the supervisory power in the English common-law courts, the
American colonies, and the federal courts. Part III discusses the
cases in which the Minnesota Supreme Court has exercised the su-
pervisory power. Part IV considers possible constitutional, statu-
tory, and common-law sources for the Minnesota Supreme Court's
supervisory power. Part V examines the scope of the power exer-
cised by the Minnesota Supreme Court and the criteria the court
has established for use of the power. Part VI considers whether the
Minnesota Court of Appeals can exercise supervisory power. Fi-
nally, this Article concludes that the Minnesota Supreme Court has
provided very little guidance or insight regarding the source,
scope, nature, or extent of the supervisory power. Further, this Ar-
ticle argues that the reasons supporting the exercise of supervisory
power by other intermediate appellate courts also support the ex-
ercise of supervisory power by the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE SUPERVISORY POWER
A. The Court of King's Bench
Commentators trace the origins of supervisory power back to
the English Court of King's Bench.' ° The state courts, as courts of
general jurisdiction, are the lineal descendants of the English
common-law courts." The English common-law courts were the
preme courts have "rejected" Supreme Court rulings - i.e., extended to state
court defendants protections broader than the federal Constitution, based on
state constitutions, rules of evidence, rules of procedure, statutes, court rules,
public policy considerations, and the supervisory power).
10. See Comment, Judicially Required Rulemaking as Fourth Amendment Policy:
An Applied Analysis of the Supervisory Power of Federal Courts, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 595,
615 (1978) ("Commentators have recognized its similarity to the exercise of pre-
rogative writs by the Court of the King's Bench.").
11. See Georgetown Note, supra note 6, at 1051-52 ("It must be remembered
that state courts are common-law courts and that the courts of the original thir-
teen states exercised the full powers of such courts before our Constitution was
adopted."); Michael S. Gilmore & Dale D. Goble, The Idaho Administrative Procedure
Act: A Primer for the Practitioner, 30 IDAHO L. REv. 273, 351 n.421 (1993/1994)
("[T]he state courts - as courts of general jurisdiction - are the lineal descendants
of the English common law courts.").
[Vol. 23
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courts of Common Pleas, King's Bench, and Exchequer. 2
The Court of King's Bench itself had its origins in the aula regis
or "great council of the king," a constant court in the king's own
hall."3 This court consisted of the king's great officers of state who
resided in the palace; the court included the lord high constable,
the lord high steward, the lord great chamberlain, the lord chan-
cellor, and others.14 The court was called the King's Bench because
the kings formerly sat there in person.' 5 Although it eventually be-
came simply a common-law court, the court continued to retain
powers of a quasi-political nature from the days when the court was
both King's Bench and Council.' 6
The Court of King's Bench was a court of appeals for the
Court of Common Pleas and all inferior courts of record in Eng-
land." It was not, however, the court of last resort. A party could
remove a case by writ of error from the Court of King's Bench to
the House of Lords, or the Court of Exchequer Chamber, depend-
ing on the nature of the suit and the manner in which it had been
prosecuted.8
Describing the jurisdiction of the Court of King's Bench, Wil-
liam Blackstone wrote:
The jurisdiction of this court is very high and transcen-
dent. It keeps all inferior jurisdictions within the bounds
of their authority, and may either remove the proceedings
to be determined here, or prohibit their progress be-
low .... It commands magistrates and others to do what
their duty requires, in every case where there is no other
specific remedy. It protects the liberty of the subject, by
speedy and summary interposition. 9
Lord Coke also described the court:
[T]his court hath not only jurisdiction to correct errors in
judiciall proceedings, but other errors and misdemean-
ours extrajudiciall tending to the breach of the peace, or
oppression of the subjects, or raising of faction, contro-
versy, debate, or any other manner of misgovernment; so
12. See 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 195 (7th ed. rev.
1956).
13. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *38.
14. See id.
15. See id. at *41.
16. See 1 HOLDSwoRTH, supra note 12, at 211.
17. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *43.
18. See id.
19. Id. at *42.
1997]
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that no wrong or injury, either publick or private, can be
done, but that this shall be reformed or punished in one
court or other by due course of law. As if any person be
committed to prison, this court upon motion ought to
grant an habeas corpus, and upon returne of the cause do
justice and relieve the party wronged. And this may be
done though the party aggrieved hath no privilege in
court. It granteth prohibitions to courts temporall and
ecclesiasticall, to keep them within their proper jurisdic-
tion.2°
The Court of King's Bench had criminal jurisdiction, civil ju-
risdiction, as well as "a general superintendence over the due ob-
servance of the law by officials and others."2' This superintendence
was exercised "partly by its process of contempt, but chiefly by
means of the prerogative writs.",2  The prerogative writs included
habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition. Through
these writs, the court was able to exercise significant control over
24inferior and rival courts.
B. The Colonies
Before the adoption of the federal Constitution, the courts of
the original thirteen colonies exercised the full powers of the Eng-
lish common-law courts, including the powers of the Court of
King's Bench.25 The colonial courts kept their common-law rule-
20. 4 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 70 (1817). One his-
torian writes, "In 1789 Coke's Fourth Institute still remained the classical state-
ment of the King's Bench's powers of superintendence and their rationale." 1
JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 784 (1971).
21. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 12, at 212.
22. Id. at 226.
23. See id. at 226-29.
24. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 532 (1984).
25. See Georgetown Note, supra note 6, at 1051-52. For example, on May 22,
1722, the General Assembly of Pennsylvania established the powers of a "Supreme
Court":
[The justices shall] exercise the jurisdictions and powers hereby granted
concerning all and singular the premises according to law, as fully and
amply, to all intents and purposes whatsoever, as the Justices of the
Court of King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer, at Westminster,
or any of them, may or can do.
Bernard F. Scherer, The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the Origins of King's Bench
Power, 32 DuQ. L. REv. 525, 525 (1994) (citing 1 Smith Laws 139 (1810)). At the
1968 constitutional convention in Pennsylvania, one delegate, a judge, asserted
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had an "inherent jurisdiction" - i.e., the
[Vol. 23
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making power after the adoption of state constitutions, which gave
state legislatures general rulemaking authority. 6  This power
passed to other states because of the rule that the courts of one
state will presume the common law of a sister state to be the same
as their own.2 7 Early in the twentieth century, various state courts
explicitly recognized the powers of the King's Bench.28
King's Bench powers - that could not be taken away without the court's own ap-
proval. Id. at 533 & n.55 (citing 2 PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
1967-68JOuRNAL, at 841 (Feb. 15, 1968)).
For a thorough discussion of the early history of the colonial King's Bench
power in the context of one of the prerogative writs, the writ of mandamus, see
Leonard S. Goodman, Mandamus in the Colonies - The Rise of the Superintending
Power of American Courts, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 308 (1957), 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1
(1958), 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 129 (1958). Goodman concludes that some states
were vested with broad King's Bench jurisdiction, but that this vesting was not
taken seriously; others used it as a "make-way... to assert broad superintending
authority"; others had the power but did not exercise it because of a strong as-
sembly or executive; and " [t] hat express King's Bench powers are not necessary to
the exercise of superintending jurisdiction is conclusively shown in those colonies
whose courts were systematically deprived of King's Bench authority." Goodman,
supra, 2 AM.J. LEGAL HIST. at 143-44.
26. See Emily Wheeler, Note, The Constitutional Right to a Trial Before a Neutral
Judge: Federalism Tips the Balance Against State Habeas Petitioners, 51 BROOK. L. REV.
841, 877 n.185 (1985) (citing Hanna v. Mitchell, 202 A.D. 504, 512-13 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1922), affd, 139 N.E. 724 (N.Y. 1923)).
27. See 1 T. COOLEY, WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *61 n.1 (4th ed.
1899).
28. See Brooks v. State ex rel. Richards, 79 A. 790, 795 (Del. 1911) (explaining
the writ of quo warranto "was a part of that vast mass of remedies for wrongs
which was brought over by the early English settlers, and which by statutory and
constitutional enactments... was by the general adoption of the powers of the
King's Bench, made a part of our civil judicature"); Lamb v. State, 107 So. 535,
537 (Fla. 1926) ("Common-law writs of procedure that have not been abrogated
or superseded by the Constitution or by statutory regulations are available in this
state .... The circuit court, being a court of general jurisdiction analogous to the
Court of King's Bench, has jurisdiction to issue writs of error coram nobis....");
Specht v. Central Passenger Ry. Co., 68 A. 785, 788 (N.J. 1908), rev'd, 72 A. 356
(N.J. 1909) ("[The writ of certiorari] is a prerogative writ by which the Supreme
Court exercises a jurisdiction derived by it from its prototype, the King's Bench of
England, that of supervising the proceedings of inferior tribunals and governmen-
tal establishments .... ."); In re Steinway, 53 N.E. 1103, 1105 (N.Y. 1899) ("Thus,
we have the powers of the court of kings bench and the court of chancery as they
existed when the first constitution was adopted [1777], blended and continued in
the supreme court of this state, except as modified by constitution or statute.").
Some care is necessary when examining cases from the earliest years of this
country's history because of the differences in the organization of the court sys-
tem at that time. One historian explains:
The clear distinction between review and trial functions developed pre-
dominantly during the nineteenth century. In the eighteenth and ear-
lier centuries, the English courts, after which American courts were gen-
1997]
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C. The Federal Courts
Commentators agree that McNabb v. United States9 marks the
beginning of the exercise of supervisory power by the federal
courts.3 In McNabb, the Supreme Court considered the admissibil-
ity of statements made by criminal defendants. The defendants,
who were charged with the murder of an officer of the Alcohol Tax
Unit of the Bureau of Internal Revenue who was engaged in the
performance of his official duties, were arrested in the middle of
the night at their home.3 They were locked in a barren cell and
held there for fourteen hours.3 2 Further, the defendants were "sub-
jected to unremitting questioning by numerous officers" for two
days. 3 One defendant confessed after being questioned continu-
ously for five or six hours.34 While in custody, the defendants were
not allowed to see relatives or friends who attempted to visit them,
and they were denied assistance of counsel.5
In McNabb, the Supreme Court stated it was not necessary to
reach the constitutional issue regarding the admissibility of state-
ments because the "scope of our reviewing power over convictions
brought here from the federal courts is not confined to ascertain-
erally patterned, had exercised both trial and appellate functions with-
out clearly delineating between the two. During the early decades of the
nineteenth century, American courts experimented with a variety of
methods, the most commonly used of which was the new trial, or a trial
de nova, in attempting to correct the errors of inferior trial courts. These
attempts formed an evolutionary process, out of which there eventually
emerged a judicial structure which separated the trial and appellate
functions while simultaneously defining both of them.
Erwin C. Surrency, The Development of the Appellate Function: The Pennsylvania Expe-
rience, 20 AM.J. LEGAL HIST. 173, 173 (1976).
One would not expect to see many cases in which courts exercised supervi-
sory power over the administration of the criminal justice system in the early and
mid-1800s. In the federal courts, there was no review available until 1879, and se-
rious crimes were not reviewable as a matter of right until 1891. See Henry P.
Weihofen, Supreme Court Review of State Criminal Procedure, 10 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
189, 189 (1966). Supreme Court review of state criminal cases as a common prac-
tice is so recent that in 1966 a commentator could state: "Almost all the leading
cases have been decided not only during my own lifetime, but during my career as
a law teacher; that is to say, during the past thirty-three years." Id.
29. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
30. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 6, at 193.
31. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 333, 344.
32. Id. at 345.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 335.
[Vol. 23
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ment of Constitutional validity."3 6 The Court reasoned:
Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal jus-
tice in the federal courts implies the duty of establishing
and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evi-
dence. Such standards are not satisfied merely by obser-
vance of those minimal historic safeguards for securing
trial by reason which are summarized as "due process by
law" and below which we reach what is really trial by
force. 7
The Court noted that the principles governing the admissibility of
evidence had not been restricted "to those derived solely from the
Constitution," but that "[i]n the exercise of its supervisory author-
ity over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts,"
the Court had formulated rules of evidence to be applied in federal
criminal prosecutions."8 In formulating those rules, the Court was
guided by "considerations ofjustice not limited to the strict canons
of evidentiary relevance." 39 The Court concluded that "[q]uite
apart from the Constitution," the defendants' statements must be
excluded. 40 The Court stated that "a conviction resting on evidence
secured through such a flagrant disregard of the procedure which
Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand without mak-
ing the courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of
law."41
After the Supreme Court commenced exercise of the supervi-
sory power in McNabb, the door opened for other federal courts to
follow suit. Supervisory power was first exercised by a federal court
of appeals in Helwig v. United States. Initially, some federal courts
of appeals claimed they did not have supervisory power over fed-
eral district courts.4 3 This initial reluctance did not last long. Since
36. Id. at 340.
37. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 340.
38. Id. at 341.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 345. Justice Reed dissented from the majority opinion, stating, "I
am opposed to broadening the possibilities of defendants escaping punishment
by these more rigorous technical requirements in the administration of justice."
Id. at 349 (Reed, J., dissenting).
42. 162 F.2d 837, 840 (6th Cir. 1947).
43. See, e.g., In re McNeil Bros., 259 F.2d 386, 387 (1st Cir. 1958). The First
Circuit observed:
The proposed petition states that our "jurisdiction of this case arises
from the general supervisory powers of the Courts of Appeals over the
judges of the District Courts of the United States." We disclaim any such
1997]
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McNabb, the federal courts of appeals have exercised supervisory
power in many cases.44
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has restricted the use
of supervisory power by the federal courts. One commentator
noted that "the rise and fall of supervisory power resembles a para-
bolic arch, beginning with McNabb, reaching its crest during the
tenure of Chief Justice Warren, and then descending precipitously
during the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.,
45
III. THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT'S USE
OF THE SUPERVISORY POWER
The Minnesota Supreme Court first mentioned the supervi-
46sory power in the context of the federal court's supervisory power.
The Minnesota Supreme Court first explicitly exercised its own su-
pervisory power in 1967 in State v. Borst.47 Since 1967, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court has exercised its supervisory power in twelve
cases. The court has used this power more frequently in the past
few years. In the last five years, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
exercised its supervisory power in seven cases.4 In another case,
function. Our jurisdiction is purely statutory in accordance with the
authority Congress has given us .... [W]e are given a limited power to
issue writs in aid of our appellate or potential appellate jurisdiction, in
28 U.S.C. § 1651 .... "Contrary to the view which seems to have been
occasionally taken, or at least sub silentio assumed, in other courts of ap-
peals, we do not think that 28 U.S.C. § 1651 grants us a general roving
commission to supervise the administration of justice in the federal dis-
trict courts within our circuit "
Id.; see also Lewis v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 194 F.2d 1005, 1006 (5th Cir. 1952)
("We have no general superintendence over district courts and cases in them, but
may interfere only when and to the extent that the laws provide.").
44. See Burton v. United States, 483 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir.) (citing 29
cases in which courts exercised supervisory power), affd on reh'g, 483 F.2d 1190
(9th Cir. 1973); Robert M. Bloom, Judicial Integrity: A Call for Its Re-emergence in the
Adjudication of Criminal Cases, 84J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 462, 474 n.76 (1993)
(listing 27 cases in which courts exercised supervisory power); Schwartz, supra
note 3, at 509-11 (listing 40 cases from a single circuit in which courts exercised
supervisory power).
45. Gershman, supra note 7, at 47.
46. See Peterson v. Peterson, 278 Minn. 275, 277, 153 N.W.2d 825, 828
(1967); State v. Collins, 276 Minn. 459, 475, 150 N.W.2d 850, 861 (1967); State ex
rel. Duhn v. Tahash, 275 Minn. 377, 380, 147 N.W.2d 382, 385 (1966); State v.
Thompson, 273 Minn. 1, 29-31, 139 N.W.2d 490, 511-12 (1966).
47. 278 Minn. 388, 397, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967).
48. See State v. Porter, 526 N.W.2d 359, 366 (Minn. 1995); State v. Scales, 518
N.W.2d 587, 589 (Minn. 1994); State v. Shorter, 511 N.W.2d 743, 747 (Minn.
1994); State v. VanWagner, 504 N.W.2d 746, 750 (Minn. 1993); State v. Salitros,
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the court expressed its intention to use the power in the future.4 9
The Minnesota Supreme Court has used its supervisory power
in a variety of ways. The court has utilized the power to order a
new trial0 and to allow a criminal defendant to have a trial by re-
quiring the trial court to withdraw a guilty plea." The supreme
court also has used its supervisory power to adopt rules.
Most frequently, the supreme court has used the power to re-
quire the provision of counsel in certain types of cases. In its first
supervisory power case, State v. Borst, the court required counsel to
be provided to an indigent defendant in any case that may lead to
incarceration in a penal institution.2 In Hepfel v. Bashaw, the court
required counsel to be provided to indigent defendants in pater-
nity adjudications in which the county attorney represents the
complainant. 53 In Cox v. Slama, the court held that "counsel must
be appointed for indigent defendants facing civil contempt for
failure to pay child support."54 Finally, in State v. Lefthand, the court
held that in-custody interrogation of a formally accused person
who is represented by counsel should not proceed prior to notifica-
tion of counsel or the presence of counsel.55
The court also used its supervisory power to require certain
kinds of proceedings in particular cases. For example, in City of
Duluth v. Sarette, the court held that a criminal obscenity charge
499 N.W.2d 815, 816, 820 (Minn. 1993); State v. Lefthand, 488 N.W.2d 799, 801
(Minn. 1992); State v. Kaiser, 486 N.W.2d 384, 386 (Minn. 1992).
49. See State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 549 (Minn. 1994).
50. See, e.g., Porter, 526 N.W.2d at 366; VanWagner, 504 N.W.2d at 750; Salitros,
499 N.W.2d at 820; Kaiser, 486 N.W.2d at 387; State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574,
586 n.9 (Minn. 1982).
51. See Shorter, 511 N.W.2d at 746-47.
52. Borst, 278 Minn. at 399, 154 N.W.2d at 893.
53. 279 N.W.2d 342, 348 (Minn. 1979); see also Note, Use of Supervisory Power to
Order Counsel for Indigent Paternity Defendants: Hepfel v. Bashaw, 64 MINN. L. REV.
848, 861 (1980) (discussing the court's use of its supervisory power to "reconcile
their desire to exercise reasoned self-restraint in constitutional interpretation with
the need to correct serious flaws in the fair administration ofjustice").
54. 355 N.W.2d 401, 403 (Minn. 1984).
55. 488 N.W.2d 799, 801-02 (Minn. 1992). Two commentators observed:
If the court's ruling in Lefihand is carried to its logical scope, law en-
forcement officers and prosecutors in Minnesota may find that very early
in the criminal justice process they are precluded from obtaining waivers
of the right to counsel from suspects in order to obtain a statement, un-
less the suspect's attorney is present or has been notified prior to any in-
terrogation.
Edwin J. Butterfoss & Lisa J. Burkett, Extending the Guiding Lefthand of Counsel:
The Minnesota Supreme Court Provides Protection Against Uncounseled Waivers of the
Right to Counsel DuringInterrogations, 17 HAMLINE L. REv. 307, 308 (1993).
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must be tried to a jury, and it remanded the case for a jury trial.56
Also, in State ex rel. Doe v. Madonna, the court held that for the
commitment statute constitutionally to operate prospectively, a
preliminary probable cause hearing must be held within seventy-
two hours after confinement, unless continued for a proper rea-
son. 57 The court noted that the rule was an "interim measure" that
would be effective "until the legislature acts."
58
The supreme court's exercise of its supervisory power has not
been limited to rules concerning lawyers and trial courts. For in-
stance, in State v. Scales, the court required police officers to record
electronically all custodial interrogations, including any informa-
tion provided about rights and any waiver of those rights. 9
In addition, the supreme court has noted an intention to use
its supervisory power in future cases. 60 In State v. Williams, the court
stated that it intended to use its supervisory power "to insure that
the systems used are increasingly inclusive in the hope that the
faces of the people in the jury room will soon mirror the faces of
the people in the community at large" and "to closely monitor and
scrutinize sentencing practices to insure that defendants of color
are not given harsher sentences for drug offenses such as this than
Caucasian defendants."
61
IV. THE SOURCE OF THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT'S
SUPERVISORY POWER
If a court may exercise a power without clearly identifying its
source, there is a danger that the court will invent powers to suit its
will and whim. Because the Minnesota Supreme Court did not ex-
ercise the supervisory power before the late 1960s, it is important
to inquire as to the source of this recent power. The Minnesota
Constitution, state statutes, and the common law are potential
sources of the supervisory power.
A. The Minnesota Constitution
A number of states have constitutional provisions granting the
56. 283 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Minn. 1979).
57. 295 N.W.2d 356, 365 (Minn. 1980).
58. Id. at 365-66 n.17.
59. 518 N.W.2d 587, 592-93 (Minn. 1994).
60. See State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 544, 549 (Minn. 1994).
61. Id.
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state's highest court "superintending" or "supervisory" powers."
The Minnesota Constitution vests the 'judicial power of the state"
63in a supreme court, the court of appeals, and the district courts.
The supreme court has "original jurisdiction in such remedial cases
as are prescribed by law." Remedial cases are the prerogative or
62. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 7, § 4 ("[The supreme court] shall have a gen-
eral superintending control over all inferior courts of law and equity ... .");
COLO. CoNsT. art. 6, § 2(1) ("[The supreme court] shall have a general superin-
tending control over all inferior courts .... ."); IOWA CONsT. art. 5, § 4 ("[The su-
preme court] shall exercise a supervisory and administrative control over all infe-
rior judicial tribunals throughout the state."); LA. CONST. art. 5, § 5(A) ("The
supreme court has general supervisory jurisdiction over all other courts."); MICH.
CONST. art. 6, § 4 ("The supreme court shall have a general superintending con-
trol over all courts.... ."); MO. CONsT. art. 5, § 4(1) ("The supreme court shall
have general superintending control over all courts and tribunals."); MONT.
CONST. art. VII, § 2(2) ("[The supreme court] has general supervisory control
over all other courts."); N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 3 ("[The supreme court] shall have
a superintending control over all inferior courts .... "); N.C. CONST. art. IV, §
12(1) ("[The supreme court] may issue any remedial writs necessary to give it
general supervision and control over the proceedings of the other courts.");
OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4 ("The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall
extend to a general superintending control over all inferior courts and all Agen-
cies, Commissions and Boards created by law."); PA. CONST. art. 5, § 10(a) ("The
Supreme Court shall exercise general supervisory and administrative authority
over all the courts and justices of the peace.. . ."); S.D. CONST. art. V, § 12 ("The
Supreme Court shall have general superintending powers over all courts and may
make rules of practice and procedure and rules governing the administration of
all courts."); Wis. CONST. art. 7, § 3(1) ("The supreme court shall have superin-
tending and administrative authority over all courts."); Wyo. CONST. art. 5, § 2
("The supreme court.., shall have a general superintending control over all in-
ferior courts .. ").
63. MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
64. Id. § 2. The supreme court described the reasons for this limited original
jurisdiction:
The Supreme Court of the state is a constitutional appellate court, with
original jurisdiction only in the particular instances in which it is ex-
pressly authorized by the Constitution .... The organization and consti-
tution of that court is adapted primarily to the work of review only. But
under every system contingencies will arise which call for the peremptory
and prompt relief which only a court of final resort can grant. Under
the English system, these instances were provided for by the King's pre-
rogative, by means of which relief was granted in cases where the ordi-
nary courts were powerless, and no other adequate remedy was provided.
In the course of time this great prerogative power came to be exercised
by means of certain remedial writs, issuing in the King's name out of the
court in which the King theoretically or in fact was always present. Rec-
ognizing the occasional necessity for such extraordinary proceedings,
the framers of the Constitution provided that the Supreme Court "shall
have original jurisdiction in such remedial cases as may be prescribed by
law, and appellate jurisdiction in all cases both in law and equity, but
there shall be no trial by jury in said court." The Legislature is thus
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extraordinary writs of the common law, such as quo warranto,
mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus.65
The supreme court has "appellate jurisdiction in all cases" and
the court of appeals has "appellate jurisdiction over all courts, ex-
cept the supreme court, and other appellate jurisdiction as pre-
scribed by law."66 Despite this seemingly vast grant of power, the
constitution has no provision expressly granting supervisory power
to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
B. Minnesota Statutes
Several states have statutes vesting the state's highest court
61with supervisory powers. Minnesota statutes give the supreme
court the power to issue "writs of error, certiorari, mandamus, pro-
hibition, quo warranto and all other writs and processes, whether
especially provided for by statute or not, that are necessary to the
execution of the laws and the furtherance ofjustice."6 The legisla-
ture enacted this statute to give effect to the provision in article 6,
section 2 of the Minnesota Constitution, which gives the supreme
court jurisdiction in remedial cases. 69 Absent any legislation or
authorized to confer original jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court in
remedial cases, subject to the limitation that there shall be no trial by
jury. It can confer original jurisdiction in no other cases.
In re Lauritsen, 99 Minn. 313, 321, 109 N.W. 404, 407-08 (1906) (citation omit-
ted).
65. See State ex rel. Ashcroft v. Jensen, 214 Minn. 193, 197-98, 7 N.W.2d 393,
396 (1943).
66. MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see also CASE DISPOSITIONAL PROCEDURES OF THE
SUPREME COURT (1993), reprinted in 51 MINN. STAT. ANN. 322, 323 (West 1993)
("The Minnesota Constitution, in Article VI, § 2, confers upon the Supreme Court
original jurisdiction in remedial cases as prescribed by law, appellate jurisdiction
in all cases and supervisory jurisdiction over all courts of the state."). Compare
this with the constitutions of South Dakota, Iowa, and Wisconsin, all of which pre-
viously were part of the Wisconsin Territory. See supra note 62.
67. See, e.g., HAw. REv. STAT. § 602-4 (1995) ("The supreme court shall have
the general superintendence of all courts of inferior jurisdiction to prevent and
correct errors and abuses therein where no other remedy is expressly provided by
law."); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 211, § 3 (West 1988) ("The supreme judicial
court shall have general superintendence of all courts of inferior jurisdiction to
correct and prevent errors and abuses therein if no other remedy is expressly pro-
vided .... ."); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 490:4 (1983) ("The supreme court shall have
general superintendence of all courts of inferior jurisdiction to prevent and cor-
rect errors and abuses .... ").
68. MINN. STAT. § 480.04 (1996).
69. See State ex rel. Young v. Village of Kent, 96 Minn. 255, 267, 104 N.W. 948,
953 (1905) (providing that "the Supreme Court has power to issue writs of error,
certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto.... subject to such regula-
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controlling considerations to the contrary, this statute is controlled
by common-law rules. 70 The King's Bench exercised its supervisory
power through the power to issue such writs. 71 In Minnesota, how-
ever, this provision has only been used to justify the use of tradi-
tional writs.
72
The supreme court also has the power to prescribe and modify
the rules of practice, 73 as well as the power to "regulate the plead-
ings, practice, procedure, and the forms thereof in criminal actions
in all courts of this state, by rules promulgated by it from time to
time."74 Some courts and commentators have discussed such rule-
making power as a basis for the exercise of supervisory power.7 5 To
promulgate a rule under this provision, however, the court must
follow certain procedures. For example, it must appoint an advi-
sory committee, distribute proposed rules, and hold hearings. 6 To
date, the supreme court has never used these procedures as a vehi-
cle for exercising its supervisory power.
The supreme court also has "all the authority necessary for
carrying into execution its judgments and determinations, and for
tions and conditions as the court may prescribe" (citation omitted)).
70. See id.
71. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. The courts of other states
previously a part of the Wisconsin Territory have held that the writs authorized by
their states' constitutions and statutes were the high prerogative writs of the Eng-
lish common law. See Duluth Elevator Co. v. White, 90 N.W. 12, 14 (N.D. 1902);
State ex rel. Moore v. Archibald, 66 N.W. 234, 235 (N.D. 1896); Everitt v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 47 N.W. 296, 297 (S.D. 1890); Attorney Gen. v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry., 35 Wis. 425, 426 (1874); Attorney Gen. v. Blossom, 1 Wis. 277, 278-80 (1853).
Federal courts, however, have held that the writs authorized by the Judiciary
Act of 1789 were not the prerogative writs of the King's Bench. See In rejoseph-
son, 218 F.2d 174, 177-79 (1st Cir. 1954); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 516 (citing
Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 364, 434 (1838); Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 87, 106-07 (1803)).
72. See, e.g., In re Welfare of C.W.S., 267 N.W.2d 496, 497 (Minn. 1978) (de-
fining writ of prohibition).
73. See MJN. STAT. § 480.05 (1996).
74. MINN. STAT. § 480.059, subd. 1 (1996); see also Maynard E. Pirsig & Ran-
dall E. Tietjen, Court Procedure and the Separation of Powers in Minnesota, 15 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 141, 177-86 (1989) (discussing the sources and scope of the
court's procedural rulemaking power).
75. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 3, at 1466-68; Hill, supra note 6, at 214; Office
of Legal Policy, supra note 6, at 788-91, 811-13; Georgetown Note, supra note 6, at
1053-56.
76. See MINN. STAT. §§ 480.052, 480.054, 480.059, subds. 2, 4 (1996). Note
also that the clause in the Pennsylvania Constitution giving the court rulemaking
power is separate from the clause granting supervisory power. See PA. CONST. art.
V, § 10(a), (c).
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the exercise of its jurisdiction as the supreme judicial tribunal of
the state, agreeable to the usages and principles of law."77 It is diffi-
cult to see how a rule adopted by a court pursuant to the supervi-
sory powers would be necessary to execute a judgment or exercise
jurisdiction. The mere fact that the supreme court was able to exe-
cute its judgments and exercise its jurisdiction before the adoption
of a supervisory power rule undercuts any argument that the rule
would be necessary for such a function. The supreme court has
never used this clause as a basis for its exercise of supervisory
power.
Minnesota statutes give general supervisory powers over state
courts to the chief justice of the supreme court.78 These powers in-
clude, but are not limited to:
(a) Supervision of the courts' financial affairs, programs
of continuing education for judicial and nonjudicial per-
sonnel and planning and operations research;
(b) Serving as chief representative of the court system
and as liaison with other governmental agencies for the
public; and
(c) Supervision of the administrative operations of the
courts.
The chief justice has the power to designate other judges or
justices to assist in performing these duties. 0 It appears, however,
that these powers are more administrative than judicial. Applying a
canon of construction, noscitur a sociis,81 one would expect the su-
pervisory power granted by this statute to be similar to the powers
enumerated in the statute, which are mainly housekeeping powers.
Further, the powers are granted to the chief justice, not to the
court as a whole. This is contrary to the statutory and constitu-
tional provisions of other states that explicitly grant the power to
the states' supreme courts. 2 The Minnesota Supreme Court never
has cited this statute as a basis for its exercise of supervisory power;
77. MINN. STAT. § 480.05 (1996).
78. See MINN. STAT. § 2.724, subd. 4 (1996).
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Noscitur a sociis means the definition of a word is or may be known from
accompanying words. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1060 (6th ed. 1990). Under
the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the meaning of a questionable word or phrase in a
statute may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or phrases
associated with it. See id.
82. See supra notes 62, 67 and accompanying text.
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the statute has been cited only in cases in which the power is used
for so-called judicial • 81forsocale juicalhousekeeping.
The court of appeals statute provides that when the supreme
court considers a petition for review, it
should take into consideration whether the question pre-
sented is an important one upon which the court has not,
but should rule, whether the court of appeals has held a
statute to be unconstitutional, whether the court of ap-
peals has decided a question in direct conflict with an ap-
plicable precedent of the supreme court, or whether the
lower courts have so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of justice as to call for an exercise of the court's
supervisory powers."
This provision was not enacted until 1982, fifteen years after the
supreme court's first exercise of supervisory power in Borst.85 Again,
the court has never cited this provision as support for its exercise of
supervisory power.
After surveying these provisions, one may conclude it is futile
to look for a constitutional or statutory basis for the supervisory
power in Minnesota. Case law confirms this idea, indicating that
although supervisory power rules have constitutional overtones,
they are not based on Minnesota's constitution or statutes. 
6
C. The Inherent Power
Some courts and commentators have found the justification
for the supervisory power in the concept of inherent power." In-
herent power "governs that which is essential to the existence, dig-
nity, and function of a court because it is a court."8 The Minnesota
83. See, e.g., In re Assignment of Judges in the Ninth Judicial Dist., 416
N.W.2d 450, 451, 453 (Minn. 1987) (stating that the chiefjustice can and will use
his or her administrative authority to correct a judge's abuse of discretion as to
assigning judges to particular tasks within the judicial district).
84. MINN. STAT. § 480A.10, subd. 1 (1996) (emphasis added).
85. See Act of March 22, 1982, ch. 501, § 12, 1982 Minn. Laws 569, 574-75,
581.
86. See State v. Gilmartin, 535 N.W.2d 650, 653 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (Peter-
son, J., concurring) (citing State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 402, 154 N.W.2d 888,
897 (1967)).
87. See Gershman, supra note 7, at 105-09 (commenting on cases using inher-
ent power as a justification for the use of supervisory power); Office of Legal Pol-
icy, supra note 6, at 788-90 (same).
88. Clerk of Court's Compensation v. Lyon County Comm'rs, 308 Minn. 172,
176, 241 N.W.2d 781, 784 (1976).
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Supreme Court stated several decades ago that
[t]he judicial power of this court has its origin in the con-
stitution, but when the court came into existence, it came
with inherent powers. Such power is the right to protect
itself, to enable it to administer justice whether any previ-
ous form of remedy has been granted or not. This same
power authorizes the making of rules of practice. 9
The supreme court has stated that the following principles
govern the exercise of inherent judicial power:
(1) Inherent judicial power grows out of express and im-
plied constitutional provisions mandating a separation of
powers and a viable judicial branch of government. It
comprehends all authority necessary to preserve and im-
prove the fundamental judicial function of deciding cases.
(2) Inherent judicial power is available to courts on all
levels to be used consistent with respective jurisdictions
and functions. Of course, review of an exercise of such
inherent power by district courts and other inferior courts
is available in this court in accordance with established
procedures.
(3) Inherent judicial power may not be asserted unless
constitutional provisions are followed and established and
reasonable legislative-administrative procedures are first
exhausted. Intragovernmental cooperation remains the
best means of resolving financial difficulties in the face of
scarce societal resources and differences of opinion re-
garding judicial procedures.
(4) When established and reasonable procedures have
failed, an inferior court may assert its inherent judicial
power by an independent judicial proceeding brought by
the judges of such court or other parties aggrieved. Such
a proceeding must include a full hearing on the merits in
an adversary context before an impartial and disinterested
district court. That court shall make findings of fact and
conclusions of law in accordance with the standards set
forth in this opinion and may grant appropriate relief.
(5) The test to be applied in these cases is whether the
relief requested by the court or aggrieved party is neces-
sary to the performance of the judicial function as con-
89. Id. at 176, 241 N.W.2d at 784 (quoting In re Greathouse, 189 Minn. 51,
55, 248 N.W. 735, 737 (1933)).
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templated in our state constitution. The test is not rela-
tive needs or judicial wants, but practical necessity in per-
forming the judicial function. The test must be applied
with due consideration for equally important executive
and legislative functions. 90
More recently, in State v. Krotzer, the supreme court held that a stay
of adjudication of a defendant's criminal charges before formal ac-
ceptance of that defendant's guilty plea was within the district
court's inherent judicial authority.9"
The supreme court has used inherent power as a basis for a
supervisory power-type ruling in only one case. In State Department
of Public Safety v. Ogg, the court established review procedures for
implied consent cases.92 The court based its decision on its "con-
sidered construction of the implied-consent statute and the other
statutes discussed herein, as well as the inherent power of this court
to superintend the lower court system, control its appellate jurisdic-
tion, and to ensure the efficient administration of justice through-
out the judicial system., 93 The court noted these procedures "may
not be the optimum solution," but the legislature was "free to re-
draft the implied-consent statute to achieve an optimum solu-
tion."94 Other than the court's use of the inherent power in Ogg,
the inherent power primarily has been used to maintain control
over the bar and the practice of law. 95
90. Id. at 180-82, 241 N.W.2d at 786 (footnotes omitted).
91. 548 N.W.2d 252, 252 (Minn. 1996).
92. 310 Minn. 433, 438-40, 246 N.W.2d 560, 563-64 (1976). The court estab-
lished the following procedures:
First, a driver who is notified his license is to be revoked for unreason-
able refusal to submit to chemical testing will have a right to obtain a
hearing before a county or municipal court, which ever is appropriate.
That court will proceed with a trial of the issues without a jury as set
forth in [Minn. Stat.] § 169.123, subd. 6. Second, either party may ap-
peal the adverse decision of the county or municipal court to district
court as provided in [Minn. Stat.] § 169.123, subd. 7. Trial in the district
court shall be de novo with right of jury trial if asserted by either party.
Third, appeal from the district court to this court shall be available to ei-
ther party only with leave of this court. There will be no direct appeal to
this court from municipal or county courts in implied consent cases.
Id. at 438-40, 246 N.W.2d at 563-64 (footnotes omitted).
93. Id. at 439-40, 246 N.W.2d at 564 (footnotes omitted) (citing MINN. CONST.
art. 1, § 8; Lyon County, 308 Minn. at 177, 241 N.W.2d at 784; In re O'Rourke, 300
Minn. 158, 174-75, 220 N.W.2d 811, 821 (1974)).
94. Ogg, 310 Minn. at 43940, 246 N.W.2d at 564.
95. See Pirsig & Tietjen, supra note 74, at 179 & n.156.
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D. Other Common-Law Powers
Even if the supervisory power does not have a constitutional or
statutory basis, and does not derive from the inherent power, it still
may be based on some common-law power other than the inherent
power. The common law came to be a part of Minnesota law
through a series of steps. The geographic area that is presently
Minnesota was once a part of the Michigan Territory, next a part of
the Wisconsin Territory, and then finally became the Minnesota
Territory.96
In 1787, the Northwest Ordinance gave judges a common-law
jurisdiction and provided that the Territory's inhabitants would be
entitled to 'judicial proceedings according to the course of the
common law."97 The question was posed as to which common law
would apply. In 1795, the governor of the Northwest Territory and
judges, acting as a legislature, adopted a statute providing that
"[tlhe common law of England... shall be the rule of decision,
and shall be considered, as of full force, until repealed by legisla-
tive authority, or disapproved of by congress.
"
0
8
The incorporation of the common law into Minnesota can be
traced through a series of historical steps. First, the English com-
mon law became a part of the law of the Michigan Territory."
Next, the act that created the Wisconsin Territory out of Michigan
incorporated by reference the provision of the Northwest Ordi-
nance guaranteeing 'judicial proceedings according to the course
of the common law."'00 Finally, Minnesota's Organic Act provided
that "the laws in force in the Territory of Wisconsin" at the time of
Wisconsin's admission as a state would continue in force.'01
The Minnesota Constitution was adopted in 1857 and pro-
vided that "all laws now in force in the territory of Minnesota"
96. See William Wirt Blume & Elizabeth Gaspar Brown, Territorial Courts and
Law: Unifying Factors in the Development of American Legal Institutions, 61 MICH. L.
REV. 467, 469 n.4 (1963). Minnesota was part of the Michigan territory from 1834
to 1836 and part of the Wisconsin Territory from 1836 to 1849. See id. Minnesota
became its own territory in 1849. See id.
97. Id. at 478 (quoting Northwest Ordinance, ch. 8, 1 stat. 51 n.9a (1787)).
98. 1 THE STATUTES OF OHIO AND OF THE NORTHWESTERN TERRITORY 190
(Chase ed. 1833); see also Blume & Brown, supra note 96, at 479-80.
99. Blume & Brown, supra note 96, at 488.
100. Wisconsin Organic Act of 1836, ch. 54, § 12, 5 Stat. 15 (1836); see also
Blume & Brown, supra note 96, at 495.
101. Minnesota Organic Act of 1849, ch. 54, § 12, 9 Stat. 407 (1849); see also
Blume & Brown, supra note 96, at 499.
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would remain in force. 10 Twenty years after the adoption of the
constitution, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the common
law of Wisconsin, which was the "common law as modified and
amended by English statutes prior to our revolution," was part of
the common law of Minnesota.'03 As a part of the English common
law, presumably the King's Bench powers were also a part of Min-
nesota's common law.104  For example, the supreme court has
stated that the district courts have "succeeded historically to the
ancient English Court of King's Bench."0 5 This statement obvi-
ously recognizes that the Court of King's Bench had both original
and supervisory jurisdiction, and refers specifically to the former.
This statement is significant to the extent that it provides an ex-
plicit recognition of the connection between the Court of King's
Bench and the Minnesota court system.
E. The Power to Supervise the Trial Courts
The supreme court has stated that the power "to reverse pro-
phylactically or in the interests of justice comes from our power to
supervise the trial courts."10 6 This claim of power is problematic.
First, it seems to be little more than a tautology - the supervisory
power comes from the power to supervise. Further, the court cites
no authority or basis for this power to supervise.
F. Summary
Minnesota courts have stated explicitly that the supervisory
power is not based on a constitutional0 7 or statutory provision.Thus, if the power has a source other than the supreme court's will
102. MINN. CONST. sched. § 2 (1857); see also Blume & Brown, supra note 96, at
500.
103. Dutcher v. Culver, 24 Minn. 584, 591 (Minn. 1877) (holding that an Eng-
lish statute, passed long before the revolution, which gave right to sell a distress,
thus changing the common law, was part of the Wisconsin common law and
hence part of the Minnesota common law); see also Blume & Brown, supra note 96,
at 500.
104. Cf State ex rel. Boldt v. Saint Cloud Milk Producers' Ass'n, 200 Minn. 1, 6,
273 N.W. 603, 606 (1937) ("This right of inspection was recognized by the courts
of King's Bench and Chancery from an early date and was enforced by motion or
mandamus. The common-law right of inspection is part of the common law and
has been enforced by all the courts in this country.").
105. In reLauritsen, 99 Minn. 313, 321, 109 N.W. 404, 407 (1906).
106. State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815, 820 (Minn. 1993).
107. See supra Part IV.A.
108. See supra Part IV.B.
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or whim, it must come from some inherent0 9 or common-law
power.1 The inherent power, as described by the Minnesota Su-
preme Court, is a different creature than the supervisory power.
Thus, perhaps the best justification for the supervisory power is
that the supreme court inherited a type of King's Bench power
when the English common law passed to Minnesota. It may be,
however, that the supervisory power is based not on some constitu-
tional, statutory, or common-law power, but simply on the court's
notions of what constitutes good policy. If this is the case, the
Minnesota Supreme Court should explicitly clarify this principle.
V. THE SCOPE OF THE MINNESOTA SUPREME
COURT'S SUPERVISORY POWER
In discussing or analyzing any power that a court possesses, it
is important to know not only the source of the power, but also
when and how a court will exercise that power. Without such
knowledge, a danger exists that the power will become a too-willing
servant of the court's caprice or whim; a servant with no fixed du-
ties, boundaries, or standards of propriety.
A. When Is It Appropriate to Exercise Supervisory Power?
In some of its opinions, the supreme court has indicated why it
was exercising the supervisory power. Some of these statements are
broad and abstract. For instance, in State v. VanWagner, the su-
preme court stated that it uses its supervisory power to protect the
"integrity of the factfinding process itself," because "as Queen
Elizabeth put it centuries ago, the prosecutor is 'not so much re-
tained pro Domina Regina [For Our Lady the Queen] as pro Domina
Veritate [For Our Lady Truth]."""
In State v. Fuller, the court also emphasized that, as the state's
highest court, "we are independently responsible for safeguarding
the rights of our citizens."112 Similarly, in State v. Caldwell, the court
stated, "[T] he denial of a new trial in this case is inconsistent with
the correct administration of criminal justice... which it is our
duty as an appellate court to supervise. 113
109. See supra Part IV.C.
110. See supra Part IV.D.
111. 504 N.W.2d 746, 750 (Minn. 1993) (citation omitted).
112. 374 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn. 1985) (internal quotation omitted).
113. 322 N.W.2d 574, 586 n.9 (Minn. 1982) (internal quotation omitted).
[Vol. 23
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss3/1
RULE(MAKE)R AND JUDGE
The supreme court also has given more practical guidance. In
a dissenting opinion in Caldwell, Justice Peterson wrote, "[T] his
court's supervisory power properly is invoked only where the pro-
cedures followed in reaching the adjudication below are amenable
to improvement."
1 4
In prosecutorial misconduct cases, the court has cited factors
that led to its exercise of its supervisory power. The court noted, in
State v. Freeman, that prophylactic reversals based on a prosecutor's
failure to comply with discovery rules were limited to cases in which
the failure to comply with the rules was clear.115 In State v. Porter,
the court indicated that the misconduct "was directed at the very
heart of the jury system ' and stated that "a prosecutor may not
seek a conviction at any price." 7 Further, the court in State v. Sali-
tros stated:
[I]n the exercise of our supervisory power over the trial
courts, in the interests of justice, and in the interests of
underscoring the fact that our rules, in providing for com-
plete disclosure to the defense, are broader than the rules
one may extract from the applicable line of federal cases
relied upon by the court of appeals, we have concluded
that defendant should receive a new trial."8
The next year, in Shorter v. State, the court stated it exercised its
power because of "the number of procedural irregularities present
in this matter."'19
At other times, the court seems to indicate that it exercised its
supervisory power because it thought it would lead to the optimal
result. For example, in City of Duluth v. Sarette, the court stated it
was clear that ajury trial was not constitutionally mandated, but the
court chose to exercise its supervisory power because "we believe
that the contemporary-community-standards test can best be ap-
plied by ajury and therefore hold, under the supervisory powers of
this court, that a criminal obscenity charge must be tried to a
jury." °20 Similarly, in Hepfel v. Bashaw, the court stated, "We hold
that counsel is required, not because we are constitutionally com-
pelled to do so, but because, given the present adversary nature of
114. Id. at 596 n.5 (Peterson,J., dissenting).
115. 531 N.W.2d 190, 199 (Minn. 1995).
116. 526 N.W.2d 359, 366 (Minn. 1995).
117. Id. (quoting State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815, 817 (Minn. 1993)).
118. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d at 820.
119. 511 N.W.2d 743, 747 (Minn. 1994).
120. 283 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Minn. 1979).
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paternity adjudications, there is no better method available to us to
protect the important interests involved.
1 2'
In State v. Borst, the lack of definitive guidance from the
United States Supreme Court was a factor in the court's use of its
supervisory power. 22 The court stated:
Until we have a definitive decision by the Supreme Court
of the United States as to whether Gideon requires ap-
pointment of counsel for an indigent charged with a mis-
demeanor as defined by our laws, as a Sixth-Amendment
right, we choose not to guess at what it may eventually
hold by basing our decision on the Federal Constitution
or even on our state Constitution.
As a result, the court based its decision on its supervisory power.
The court also has discussed considerations for the future ex-
ercise of its supervisory power. In State v. Williams, the court stated
that it intends to use the power in future cases "to insure that the
systems used are increasingly inclusive in the hope that the faces of
the people in the jury room will soon mirror the faces of the peo-
ple in the community at large," as well as to "closely monitor and
scrutinize sentencing practices to insure that defendants of color
are not given harsher sentences for drug offenses such as this than
Caucasian defendants."
2 4
B. How Has the Minnesota Supreme Court Exercised Supervisory Power?
When the supreme court has exercised its supervisory power
to make a rule, it sometimes has indicated how the rule is to be ap-
plied. For example, in Cox v. Slama, the court discussed very spe-
cific conditions under which provision of counsel was necessary.125
121. 279 N.W.2d 342, 348 (Minn. 1979).
122. 278 Minn. 388, 389-90, 154 N.W.2d 888, 889 (Minn. 1967).
123. Id. at 397, 154 N.W.2d at 894.
124. 525 N.W.2d 538, 544, 549 (Minn. 1994).
125. 355 N.W.2d 401, 403-04 (Minn. 1984). The court decreed the following
conditions for provision of counsel:
1. Where the court has either a custodial or a non-custodial parent
before it, whether the parent is represented by either the county attor-
ney or private counsel, pursuant to an order to show cause or a con-
tempt citation, and the court reaches a point in the proceedings after
the taking of testimony that incarceration is a real possibility, the court
shall immediately suspend the hearing.
2. The court shall then determine whether the parent charged with
contempt desires counsel and give that parent an opportunity to obtain
private counsel or if the parent claims that he cannot afford counsel, the
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Ten years later, in State v. Scales, the court indicated that the rule
regarding provision of counsel applied prospectively from the date
of the filing of the opinion.126 The court also stated, "[T]he Advi-
sory Committee on Criminal Rules may further consider the issue
of the proper scope of the exclusionary rule in this context."2 7 Be-
cause the rule adopted in Scales was not a constitutional rule, it did
not have to be applied to criminal cases pending on direct re-
view. 128 The court also has stated that the rule it adopted was
"meant to function as [an] interim measure[] until the Minnesota
Legislature acts.
"
,1
9
VI. THE MINNESOTA COURT OF APPEALS
AND THE SUPERVISORY POWER
The Minnesota Supreme Court has indicated in a number of
opinions that it possesses supervisory power. The supreme court,
however, never has indicated whether the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals also holds such power. Despite the supreme court's silence,
the court of appeals has spoken on this issue.
A. Statements by the Court of Appeals Regarding Whether It Has
Supervisory Power
Since 1993, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has discussed or
mentioned the supervisory power in at least nineteen cases. 13° In
court shall then determine, by applying the standard of indigency as
enumerated in Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure 5.02, subd. 3,
whether the parent is, in fact, indigent.
3. If the court determines that the parent is indigent, it shall provide
counsel to such parent. The local units of government shall determine
how to provide such counsel in accordance with local practice.
4. After appointment of counsel, the court shall conduct a trial de
novo on the question as to whether the parent is, in fact, in contempt.
5. Counsel so appointed for such parent shall represent his client in
the contempt proceedings and those narrow, ancillary issues related to
contempt only. He shall not represent such parent in other issues related
to the dissolution of the marriage.
Id.
126. 518 N.W.2d 587, 593 (Minn. 1994).
127. Id.
128. See Williams, 525 N.W.2d at 289.
129. State ex rel. Doe v. Madonna, 295 N.W.2d 356, 366 (Minn. 1980).
130. See State v. Rowe, No. C5-96-1742, 1997 WL 132987 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar.
25, 1997); State v. Coleman, 560 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Ol-
son, No. C9-96-531, 1997 WL 10876 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 1997); Yang v. State,
No. C1-95-1565, 1996 WL 45173, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 1996); State v. Kvis-
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the majority of appellate cases addressing this issue, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals has stated that it does not possess supervisory131
power. In a few recent cases, however, some judges have sug-
gested that the court of appeals may have this power.
In two unpublished decisions, judges have commented on the
court of appeal's supervisory power. In Shorter v. State, Judge Nor-
ton, concurring in part and dissenting in part, stated, "I believe
that the state's violation of the discovery rules is serious enough to
warrant this court's exercise of its supervisory powers and order a
trial on the merits.", 32 One year later, in State v. Spiegler, the court
noted: "We decline to exercise this supervisory role where there is
no showing of prejudice and where the record also gives no indica-
tion that the prosecutor's performance of his public duty was af-
fected by his law partner's representation of appellant." 33 Both of
these statements were made in unpublished opinions and thus
tero, No. C1-95-1047, 1996 WL 22320, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 1996); State
v. Lopez, 538 N.W.2d 705, 707 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (Randall, J., concurring);
State v. Proffitt, No. C2-95-1137, 1995 WL 579218, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 3,
1995); Chelman v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, No. C0-95-505, 1995 WL 497349,
at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 1995); Geray v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, No.
C8-95-221, 1995 WL 497436, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 1995); Neitzel v.
Commissioner of Pub. Safety, Nos. C3-95-613, C9-95-745, 1995 WL 497300, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 1995); Sullivan v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, No. C9-
95-79, 1995 WL 479570, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 1995); State v. Gilmartin,
535 N.W.2d 650, 653 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Umphlett v. Commissioner of Pub.
Safety, 533 N.W.2d 636, 640 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Swan v. State, No. C3-94-2500,
1995 WL 351684, at *2 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. June 13, 1995); State v. Martinson, No.
C2-94-2214, 1995 WL 59123, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 1995); State v. Spie-
gler, No. C3-93-2230, 1994 WL 411664, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 1994); State
v. Maurstad, No. C2-93-1392, 1994 WL 85780, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 15,
1994); State v. McKee, No. C3-92-967, 1993 WL 216856, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App.
June 22, 1993); Shorter v. State, No. CO-92-1185, 1993 WL 71537, at *5 (Minn. Ct.
App. Mar. 16, 1993) (Norton,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
131. See Kvistero, 1996 WL 22320, at *2 ("Modification of the recording re-
quirement of Scales should be left to the discretion of the supreme court, and
Kvistero's argument is without merit."); Sullivan, 1995 WL 479570, at *2 ("We de-
cline to exercise powers reserved to this state's supreme court."); Gilmartin, 535
N.W.2d at 653 ("As an intermediate appellate court, we decline to exercise super-
visory powers reserved to this state's supreme court."); Umphlett, 533 N.W.2d at
640 ("Since this court does not have supervisory power, we are reluctant to ex-
pand the holding beyond the rule announced in Scales."); Maurstad, 1994 WL
85780, at *2 ("We decline to exercise powers reserved to this state's supreme
court."); McKee, 1993 WL 216856, at *3 ("We note initially that the supreme court,
in reversing the conviction in Salitros, did so on the basis of its supervisory power
over the trial courts, a power that we do not believe resides in this court.").
132. Shorter, 1993 WL 71537, at *5.
133. Spiegler, 1994 WL 411664, at *2.
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have no precedential value.3 3 The statements, however, may indi-
cate a willingness on the part of some court of appeals judges to
exercise supervisory power.
The most significant commentary regarding the court of ap-
peals' supervisory power appeared in a concurrence in a published
opinion directly discussing the issue of "the supervisory power of
the Minnesota Court of Appeals over the administration of jus-
tice." 35 In State v. Lopez, Judge Randall noted, "I do not argue with
the Gilmartin and Umphlett panels, but only suggest that our court
should not be so quick to suffer the soft impeachment." 136 Randall
argued, in characteristically colorful language, that:
Thus, if trial courts have the express benefit of [Minne-
sota Statutes] section 631.21 (I note that the statute is not
limited to trial or district courts, but merely states "the
court" and we are "a court") and the supreme court has
supervisory power, it requires no stretch of the imagina-
tion to assume that panels of the Minnesota Intermediate
Court of Appeals can dip their toes in the supervisory wa-
ters if and when needed.
Judge Randall concluded, "Thus, any discussion of 'supervisory
powers' has to be limited to 'which supervisory power'? Restric-
tions on our supervisory powers are rare. The Minnesota Court of
Appeals does not get involved in attorney discipline, but we have
far more areas of supervisory power than we do not."13" In response
to Judge Randall's concurrence, the other members of the panel
stated: "We decline to address the issue of what supervisory power
this court may have, but see the concurrence, which is compelling
on this point."
39
B. Comparisons to Other Courts That Have Exercised Supervisory Power
In examining whether the Minnesota Court of Appeals has su-
pervisory power, a comparison to other courts that have exercised
supervisory power is useful. This Part compares the Minnesota
Court of Appeals to the Court of King's Bench and to the federal
134. See MINN. STAT. § 480A.08, subd. 3(c) (1996) ("Unpublished opinions of
the court of appeals are not precedential.").
135. Lopez, 538 N.W.2d at 707-08 (Randall,J., concurring).
136. Id. at 707.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 708.
139. Id. at 707 n.1.
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courts of appeals.
1. Comparison to the Court of King's Bench
The first analogy that can be drawn is between the Minnesota
Court of Appeals and the Court of King's Bench. Like the Minne-
sota Court of Appeals, the Court of King's Bench was not a court of
last resort.14 The court of last resort in that jurisdiction was the
House of Lords.
14
1
In addition, the Court of King's Bench exercised its supervi-
sory power through the prerogative writs, such as habeas corpus,
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.' 42 The Minnesota Court of
Appeals similarly has the power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibi-
tion, and mandamus.' 43 The supreme court has explicitly recog-
nized this authority:
The Supreme Court has supervisory authority over all ac-
tions in the trial courts and the Court of Appeals. It does
not normally issue supervisory writs concerning matters
pending in the trial courts, as the Court of Appeals also has
supervisory authority over those proceedings.
1 44
Thus, to the extent the exercise of supervisory power is akin to the
exercise of the King's Bench power, the court of appeals may be a
140. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 17-18 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
143. See MINN. STAT. § 480A.06, subd. 5 (1996) ("The court of appeals shall
have jurisdiction to issue all writs and orders necessary in aid of its jurisdiction
with respect to cases pending before it and for the enforcement of its judgments
or orders."); MINN. R. CIv. APP. P. 120.01 ("Application for a writ of mandamus or
of prohibition or for any other extraordinary writ in the Supreme Court directed
to the Court of Appeals or in the Court of Appeals directed to a lower court shall
be made by petition."). Some commentators claim that "the court [of appeals]
clearly possesses inherent power to grant or refuse extraordinary writs." 4
DOUGLAS D. MCFARLAND & WILLIAMJ. KEPPEL, MINNESOTA CIVIL PRACTICE § 2801, at
336 n.2 (2d ed. 1990).
144. CASE DIsPOsmoNAL PROCEDURES OF THE SUPREME COURT (1993), reprinted
in 51 MINN. STAT. ANN. 322, 325 (West 1993) (emphasis added); see also 3 ERICJ.
MAGNUSON & DAVID F. HERR, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: APPELLATE RULES ANNOTATED §
120.3 (3d ed. 1996) ("[A]s a result of the judicial restructuring occasioned by the
creation of the court of appeals, the supreme court no longer entertains applica-
tions to review actions of the trial courts. All such applications [for extraordinary
writs] are made to the court of appeals."); Stefan A. Riesenfeld et al., Judicial Con-
trol of Administrative Action by Means of the Extraordinay Remedies in Minnesota (Pts. I,
V, VI), 33 MINN. L. REV. 569, 571-73 (1949), 36 MINN. L. REV. 435, 435-38 (1952),
37 MINN. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1952) (discussing the early history of the extraordinary
writs in Minnesota).
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closer analogy to the Court of King's Bench than is the supreme
court, because the court of appeals is the court issuing writs to the
trial court. 145
Other state supreme courts have drawn a connection between
the supervisory power, the powers of the Court of King's Bench,
and the state courts' power to issue writs. Early in this century, the
Colorado Supreme Court, in People ex rel. Graves v. District Court of
Second Judicial District, considered whether a district court had ju-
risdiction to issue a writ of prohibition. 46 The Colorado court re-
lied on cases from Wisconsin, of which Minnesota was once a part,
in arguing that the writs the Colorado Supreme Court had the
power to issue were the "prerogative writs of the old common
law." 47 The court cited a Supreme Court case for the proposition
that the writs are not "incident to any court which did not possess
the general superintending power of the Court of King's Bench."'4
The court indicated that "the same theory prevails in our state gov-
ernments, where the common law is adopted and governs in the
administration of justice. " 149 Thus, if the prerogative writs are inci-
dent to courts that possess supervisory power, would not supervi-
sory power be incident to those courts empowered to issue the pre-
rogative writs? Even if it is not the case, this reasoning at least
establishes a link between the supervisory power and the power to
issue the prerogative writs.
2. Comparison to the Federal Courts of Appeals
A second analogy, this one between the Minnesota Court of
Appeals and the federal courts of appeals, can be drawn. First, like
the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the federal courts of appeals are
aligned between the trial courts and the court of last resort. Sec-
145. Cf McFARLAND & KEPPEL, supra note 143, § 2802, at 337 ("In the bulk of
cases, an extraordinary writ will issue out of the court of appeals.").
146. 86 P. 87, 92 (Colo. 1906).
147. Id. at 89.
148. Id. at 90 (quoting Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. 524, 630 (1838)).
149. Id. The court said the power of issuing a writ generally belongs to the
highest state court. Id. At that time, however, the Colorado Court of Appeals did
not exist; the court of appeals did not begin operating until 1970. COUNCIL OF
CHIEFJUDGES OF THE COURTS OF APPEAL, DIRECTORY OFJUDGES OF STATE COURTS OF
APPEAL 39 (1996). Because Colorado had no intermediate appellate court, refer-
ring to the highest state court should be read as distinguishing a reviewing court
from a trial court, not the court of last resort from the intermediate appellate
court.
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ond, similar to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the federal courts
of appeals were a statutory creation coming long after the creation
of the court of last resort. The federal courts of appeals were cre-
ated in 1891, 102 years after the creation of the United States Su-
preme Court.5 ° Similarly, the Minnesota Court of Appeals was cre-
ated in 1983, 134 years after the creation of the Minnesota
Territorial Supreme Court.1 5 1 Third, the federal courts of appeals
were created for the same purpose as the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals - to alleviate the burdens on the Supreme Court.5 2 Fourth,
and perhaps most important, the justifications given for the exer-
cise of supervisory power by the federal courts of appeals are
equally applicable to a state intermediate appellate court like the
Minnesota Court of Appeals.
The reason most commonly given for a federal intermediate
appellate court's exercise of supervisory power is a bare assertion
that the supervisory power is inherent in the powers of federal ap-
pellate courts. This should not be confused with inherent power,
because that term has been given a very specific meaning by the
Minnesota Supreme Court.154 If such a power is not unique to the
federal courts but is inherent in the nature of a court, then the
power should be inherent in state courts as well. If, however, there
is something unique about federal courts that gives rise to this in-
herent power, those courts have never said what that unique fea-
ture is or might be.
150. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 517; Jack B. Weinstein, The Limited Power of
the Federal Courts of Appeals to Order a Case Reassigned to Another District Judge 120
F.R.D. 267, 274 (1988). Before the courts of appeals were created, the federal
court system consisted of the district courts, the circuit courts, and the Supreme
Court. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 517 n.49. The circuit courts had significant
original jurisdiction and the authority to review on a writ of error the final deci-
sions of district courts in most civil cases. See id. The circuit courts were abolished
in 1911. See id.
151. See ROLAND C. AMUNDSON, A SEARCH FOR PLACE: THE HISTORY OF THE
MINNESOTAJUDICIAL CENTER 40-42 (1995). See generally ROLAND C. AMUNDSON, THE
FiRST TEN (1993) (providing an entertaining and informative history of the first
ten years of the Minnesota Court of Appeals).
152. See Weinstein, supra note 150, at 274.
153. See, e.g., Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir.
1994); United States v. Heinz, 983 F.2d 609, 617 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Larrazolo, 869 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Kilpatrick, 821
F.2d 1456, 1465 (10th Cir. 1987), affd sub nom. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United
States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988); United States v. Harrison, 716 F.2d 1050, 1053 n.1
(4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Gjieli, 717 F.2d 968, 977 (6th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Cortina, 630 F.2d 1207, 1214 (7th Cir. 1980).
154. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
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Another frequently cited reason for the use of supervisory
power by the federal courts of appeals is that the exercise of the
power is justified as a means to implement a remedy for a violation
of recognized rights, to preserve judicial integrity, and to deter il-
legal conduct.' This argument tends to confuse the source of the
power with the scope of the power. It would be an exceptional
proposition indeed to claim that federal courts need to implement
remedies for recognized rights, preserve judicial integrity, and de-
ter illegal conduct, but that state appellate courts do not.
In a handful of opinions, the United States Supreme Court has
explicitly or implicitly approved of federal intermediate appellate
supervisory power.156 Federal appellate courts often cite these opin-
155. See United States v. Simpson, 979 F.2d 1282, 1288-89 (8th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Osorio, 929 F.2d 753, 763 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Gon-
salves, 781 F.2d 1319, 1320 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. DiBernardo, 775 F.2d
1470, 1475 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Butts, 729 F.2d 1514, 1524 (5th Cir.
1984); United States v. Martinez, 667 F.2d 886, 890-91 (10th Cir. 1981). One fed-
eral appeals court commented, "'[I]nherent authority' is not a substitute for a
good reason .... [A] court needs a good reason to create a new rule of common
law; and given the rule, there must be good reason for the exercise of the power
in a particular case." Soo Line R.R. v. Escanaba & Lake Superior R.R., 840 F.2d
546, 551 (7th Cir. 1988).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505-07 (1983) ("[G]uided
by considerations of justice, and in the exercise of supervisory powers, federal
courts may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required by
the Constitution or the Congress." (citation and internal quotation omitted));
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 & n.7 (1980) ("Federal courts may use
their supervisory power in some circumstances to exclude evidence taken from
the defendant by 'willful disobedience of law'.... The supervisory power merely
permits federal courts to supervise the 'administration of criminal justice' among
parties before the bar." (citations omitted)); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S.
637, 648 n.23 (1974) ("We do not, by this decision, in any way condone prosecu-
torial misconduct, and we believe that trial courts, by admonition and instruction,
and appellate courts, by proper exercise of their supervisory power, will continue
to discourage it."); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973) ("Within such a
unitary framework the appellate court will, of course, require the trial court to
conform to constitutional mandates, but it may likewise require it to follow pro-
cedures deemed desirable from the viewpoint of sound judicial practice although
in no-wise commanded by statute or by the Constitution."); Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514, 530 n.29 (1972) ("Nothing we have said should be interpreted as disap-
proving of a presumptive rule adopted by a court in the exercise of its supervisory
powers which establishes a fixed time period within which cases must normally be
brought."); Bartone v. United States, 375 U.S. 52, 54 (1963) (stating that in fed-
eral proceedings both the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court have "broad
powers of supervision"); La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259-60
(1957) ("We believe that supervisory control of the District Courts by the Courts
of Appeals is necessary to proper judicial administration in the federal system.").
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ions as the basis for their own exercise of supervisory power."7 As
one commentator has noted, however, the fact that the Supreme
Court has approved of such a power does not, by itself, clarify the
source of the power:
Unfortunately, although Supreme Court statements may
establish the existence of intermediate appellate supervi-
sory power, they do not advance the inquiry as to whether
any particular exercise of supervisory power is legitimate.
This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the Su-
preme Court has never explained the basis for its asser-
tion that the courts of appeals have supervisory power."'
Several other justifications for federal appellate court supervi-
sory power are cited less frequently. One such justification is that
the supervisory power is based on the structure of the federal court
system, i.e., that it derives from Article III of the Constitution, the
Court of Appeals Act, or is implicit in the concept of the separation
of powers. 5 9 Such structural arguments do not distinguish federal
court supervisory power from state court supervisory power be-
cause the federal appellate system was modeled after state court sys-
tems.16° A second, less common justification is that the supervisory
power is a form of the federal common law. 1" If the common law is
the basis for the supervisory power, state intermediate appellate
courts would have a better claim to such a power than the federal
intermediate appellate courts, because state courts are common-
law courts, whereas federal courts are not.6 2  Finally, an even
stronger case for the Minnesota Court of Appeals' exercise of su-
pervisory powers may be made because, unlike the federal courts of
appeals, the Minnesota Court of Appeals' decisions are effective
statewide, whereas the decisions of federal courts of appeals are
157. See, e.g., United States v. Leslie, 759 F.2d 366, 370 n.2 (5th Cir. 1985).
158. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 524-25.
159. See, e.g., United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 759-60 (1st Cir. 1994);
United States v. Rubio-Villareal, 967 F.2d 294, 301 (9th Cir. 1992); Eash v. Riggins
Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Bazzano, 712
F.2d 826, 852 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Gonsalves, 691 F.2d 1310, 1318-19
(9th Cir. 1982).
160. See Weinstein, supra note 150, at 275. An intermediate federal court
"simplifies the whole judicial establishment by modeling the system largely after
the systems in the [state courts]." Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 50-942, at 4 (1888)).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Schwartz, 787 F.2d 257, 267 (7th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Widgery, 778 F.2d 325, 328-29 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Gatto, 763 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1985).
162. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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controlling only in their respective circuits.1
6
3
C. Summary
It is seldom disputed that courts of last resort have supervisory
power. However, some intermediate courts of appeals also have
exercised supervisory powers. The reasons that justify the use of
supervisory power by those intermediate appellate courts also
should apply to the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
VII. CONCLUSION
To date, the Minnesota Supreme Court's supervisory power
cases have given little guidance or insight regarding the source, na-
ture, and scope of that power. Commentators often have criticized
the Supreme Court, the federal courts of appeals, and other state
courts regarding their supervisory power jurisprudence.'6 Similar
charges have been leveled at the use of inherent powers.161
163. Cf Schwartz, supra note 3, at 524 ("Moreover, given the structure of the
federal court system, it is by no means self-evident that the existence of such a
power in the Supreme Court, which is capable of imposing uniform, systemwide
standards, implies the existence of analogous powers in regional intermediate ap-
pellate courts."). In addition, as noted above, state courts have held that the writs
are the high prerogative writs of the common law, while federal courts have not.
See supra note 71.
164. See, e.g., Georgetown Note, supra note 6, at 1050 ("In invoking this as-
serted supervisory authority, the federal courts have been notably reticent about
its source and nature."). Schwartz writes:
The nature of supervisory power is amorphous and its doctrinal limita-
tions are ill-defined .... A brief examination of Third Circuit cases re-
veals the virtually unlimited scope of the doctrine .... These concerns
may explain ... the Third Circuit's willingness to employ what seems to
be a nearly limitless power .... The Third Circuit rarely sets forth the
source of its authority to exercise supervisory power.
Schwartz, supra note 3, at 507, 509, 512, 514.
165. See, e.g., STUMPF, supa note 2, at xiii, 1. Stumpf observes:
Often these words [inherent powers] simply appear in a sentence that
assumes the existence of an inherent power without any analysis or ra-
tionalization of its use, almost en passant .... Despite its extensive exer-
cise, learned writers have described the concept as 'shadowy' and 'nebu-
lous,' or as 'a problem of definition that has eluded or bedeviled many
courts and commentators for years....' The rhetoric of appellate courts
when speaking of inherent powers has a tendency to be fulsome and tal-
ismanic so that the mere statement of the concept becomes a substitute
for any analysis of whether its use is appropriate or justified. Its indis-
criminate employment in differing contexts also can yield to confusion
and ambiguity.
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If the Minnesota Court of Appeals is to exercise supervisory
power, the best argument in its favor simply may be that such an
exercise would be no less legitimate than the exercise of supervi-
sory power by the federal intermediate appellate courts or the
Court of King's Bench. This is not a ringing endorsement, but at
least it acknowledges the consistent criticism of the exercise of su-
pervisory power by federal intermediate appellate courts and the
weak defense of such a power, in those small number of cases when
any explicit defense is even offered. Regardless of the ultimate
resolution of this issue, however, it at a minimum deserves careful
consideration by, and a thoughtful, detailed, and specific answer
from, the Minnesota Supreme Court and the Minnesota Court of
Appeals.
When Moses' authority to be a ruler and judge was challenged,
he did not answer the question, and instead fled.166 When the
Minnesota Supreme Court is presented with the challenge regard-
ing the source and scope of its supervisory authority to make rules
and judge, it should not emulate Moses.
166. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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